

*Empire and Nation:
Tensions and
Convergences in
Russia, 1861–1905*

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In the greater course of the twentieth century, nation and empire have been juxtaposed. The nation is privileged in the role of the 'good', as the product and vehicle of modernity, as the mark of progress associated with the ideals of liberty, democracy and self-determination; while the empire is condemned in the role of the 'bad', inexorably associated with expansionism, conquest, imperialism, arbitrariness and tyranny. However, in today's age of globalisation and European unification, where the future of the nation-state appears uncertain, this contrast along value lines appears less convincing, if not simplistic. Indeed, in view of the recent extended violence carried out by nation states in the name of unity and territorial integrity and the corresponding rise of ethnic nationalisms reacting with their own wanton violence, the concept of empire has appeared in a more favourable light. It is increasingly associated with the idea of loose and porous frontiers; the imperial mentality is associated with the concept of tolerance and with the elegant and pragmatic management of ethnic and national heterogeneity in its jurisdiction. Thus, the concept of empire is studied nowadays not only as the historical precursor of recent trends but also as a theoretical model for conceptualising a new possible future alternative.¹

This discussion has increasingly come to the fore in present-day multi-ethnic Russia, in its attempt to redefine its identity and come to terms with its past and its long experience of imperial rule. Thus in public and scientific discourse, there is an ongoing debate (with little sign of consensus emerging) whether it is possible or advisable to erase – as has

largely been the case until recently – a valuable historical experience in which the Russians were the participants as well as the creators. There is a quest for a navigation point that could provide answers on how to cope with the acute present-day dilemmas and problems in the Russian Federation, both internally, particularly in regard to the Chechen minefield, as well as externally with regard to the country's relations with the various states of the 'near abroad', those states which formed the Soviet Union along with Russia until 1991.²

Given the renewed interest in the trappings of empire of late, the study of the Russian Empire, always a fascinating subject in its own right, has attracted greater attention.

In the Russian case the period from the Great Reforms of the eighteen sixties until the Revolution of 1905 is central to the discussion of the interplay between empire and nation. 1905 was a milestone, as following the first Russian Revolution, a constitution was introduced which permitted political parties and finally allowed the masses to enter the realm of politics.³ The Great Reforms that commenced in the eighteen sixties contributed to rapid economic development and to the social and structural differentiation of the Russian scene. All this gave rise to a new political reality favourable to the emergence of a new social and political consciousness, often described as *obshchestvennost'*,⁴ a multi-hued concept, which at its very core implies at least two things: the emergence of a civic society and the shaping of a civic consciousness, clearly implying that Russian nationals are in fact citizens entitled to claim the right of participation in society.⁵ This was when the Russian state and society come face to face with a political problem of a new order: nationalism (obviously non-state nationalism or ethnonationalism in current parlance) as amply demonstrated in the Polish Revolt of 1863.

This article will proceed along two tracks. Firstly, it will dwell on some of the recent findings of the new, more sophisticated approaches on Tsarist Russia that have surfaced in since 1990 and which provide greater insight into the interplay between empire and nation.⁶ Secondly, it will highlight several issues from the debates on coming to terms with the 'national question' in the imperial Tsarist context and beyond, which were carried out between distinguished members of the Russian intelligentsia in the second part of the nineteenth century.

The problematic nature of empire has contributed in no small measure in making it more than obvious, at least among Russia specialists, that the Russian state was hardly a national state of the Russian nation.⁷ The intellectual and political elites of the Russian state varied ethnically, linguistically and religiously; even in the higher echelons, there were not only Orthodox Russians, but also, for example, Catholic Poles, Protestant Baltic Germans, Muslim Tatars from the Volga region and the Urals. The Romanov Dynasty, itself partly Russian and partly European (as a result of intermarriage), strove to retain its predominance on the basis of the social divisions of the population, that is on social-class criteria rather than on ethnic, religious, linguistic or other ascriptive affinities.

The concept of Russia as a state identifying itself with the Great Russians emerged gradually in the second half of the nineteenth century. This new notion of statehood is associated to a considerable extent with the Russian historians of the time who began to narrate the history of the Russian state within a national context.⁸ This new reading of history and 'reality' chose to ignore the fact that Russia had not been a nation-state or a state associated with one dominant nation; it was a country that for most of its history had been a mosaic of ethnic groups, cultures, languages, religions and

dogmas. Russian nationalism was one among many other ideologies *cum* group identities, vying for influence in the wide spectrum of the Empire. As argued by Andreas Kappeler, at the end of the nineteenth century Russia's priorities were above all securing and not jeopardising the Empire's power and status as a Great Power, its security, internally as well as externally, the loyalty of its citizens and the avoidance of conflict-prone policies regarding ethnicity and cultural diversity.⁹

In the attempt to meet these vital interests and goals, the last three Romanov Tsars opted for a policy of unification and strove to fuse the empire, culturally and administratively and, to the greatest degree possible, to eradicate local peculiarities. This policy of 'Russification', a very emotionally charged and value-laden term, is stereotypically associated with the attempts of the Romanovs to alter the ethnic and cultural diversity of the country in the name of Russian homogeneity.¹⁰

Since the late nineteenth century, the 'new imperial Russian history' refers to the policies of Russification and not to a consistent grand strategy of Russification. This turn was influenced, in particular, by Edward Thaden's pace-setting work on Russification, in which he makes a very useful distinction between what he calls administrative and cultural Russification.¹¹ If state policies were placed on a spectrum ranging from a model of a nationally homogenised Russian state at one end to a culturally diverse state at the other, actual state policies would be balanced somewhere in the middle, as the more extreme forms of cultural assimilation were less common. The predominant view was that some differences had to be expunged while others could persist.¹² The policies of Russification differed from one region or case to another. There was an array of forms of unification used depending on the region or case concerned, as depicted by the following terms: Christianisation, assimilation, rapprochement, integration, acculturation, civilising mission and straight-forward Russification. In some instances, the elimination of differences was fostered on a voluntary basis (individually or collectively); in many, it was induced or even forced; in others, it was more of a natural process of integration. Obviously, some forms of difference were more palatable than others. Mostly, pragmatism was the overriding criterion and in this context, the Polish case is a good example. The Russian authorities were well aware that they could not realistically hope to assimilate or Russify a culturally equivalent if not more potent (owing to their longer history) people than themselves.¹³

A variety of other factors played a considerable role in the implementation as well as the effectiveness of these policies, such as the economic, administrative and other capabilities of the Russian state at any given moment (as a whole and in the region in question). In addition, the actual abilities and attitudes of state officials, those charged with the task of adopting the policies and their actual zeal – which was often too much or too little – in carrying out their instructions, were crucial, as were regional or country-wide changes in attitudes or the streamlining of policies based on experience. Nowadays scholars, be they Russian or Western, who have studied this question from the prism of Russian bureaucrats, take the view that the policy of Russification of the last three Romanov Tsars was, for the most part, not as uniform, consistent, systematic or unflinching as it was believed to be only a few decades ago.¹⁴

It is also worth stressing that the policy of Russification differed from modern-day nationalism for its avowed aim was firstly the unity of a non-national imperial state and secondly the bolstering of Russian culture.¹⁵ Of course, as has been correctly pointed out, Alexander III tended to

utilize, in his various pronouncements and other official presentations, the symbols and other paraphernalia associated with the language of nationalism, as understood in the Russian context.¹⁶ Yet, most of the time he also made it a point to positively refer to the multi-ethnic character of Russia as a whole. The national imperative, that is to say the creation of a state that would embody the Russian nation alone, was alien to the conservative Romanovs, who could afford to wield several other important symbols of unity that were less restrictive, thereby providing ample room for non-Russians in what was intended as a wider imperial embrace.¹⁷

The Russification policies may also be viewed from another perspective. They can be placed under the framework of the anti-reform policy undertaken by Alexander III, with his emphasis on absolutism, at a time when the country's transformation brought to the fore new social and economic forces that called for more flexible forms of governance.

Patriotism as distinct from nationalism remained the main vehicle of the state elites in their attempt to foment loyalty to the state. It was the view that everyone in the Empire, irrespective of ethnicity, could be a devoted Russian subject, faithful to the sovereign, who could serve his country loyally to the best of his abilities. State patriotism retained its salience, witnessed by the fact that, until the early twentieth century, the higher echelons of imperial society retained a marked degree of political cohesion irrespective of their ethnic origin.¹⁸ From the mid-nineteenth century, the imperial administrators began to regard the concept of citizenship (*grazhdanstvennost'*) as a more subtle and effective avenue in the attempt to integrate the non-Russian peoples of the Empire. Citizenship could also prove salutary when it came to sensitive borderland regions. This Russian rendition of citizenship had at least three dimensions: building a common collective identity; constructing a public sphere; and wishing to foster an image of the loyal imperial citizen, who was content even though popular sovereignty had not been granted (and his citizenship was more or less coterminous with the status of a mere imperial subject).¹⁹

The various new perspectives of Russian history also shed light on the reverse side of the coin, particularly what it meant for someone to be a Russian subject/citizen in the sense of identifying with the state. What did Russianness imply for non-ethnic Russian subjects/citizens? To what degree did they desire, especially at the elite level, to partake of Russian culture²⁰ and to participate actively in the affairs of the Empire?²¹ Setting aside the bipolarities of empire/nation and Russian/non-Russian, which implies polarization, confrontation and subjugation, would it be too far-fetched to envisage faith and loyalty inter-ethnic cooperation, cross-fertilization or a modicum of reconciliation across ethnic communities? If this is plausible and was extensive in scope, was implosion and disintegration on ethnic grounds inevitable in Russia?²²

Since 1990, the new historical approaches on the history of the Russian Empire have called into question the traditional black and white tapestry of the Russian Empire as 'the dungeon of peoples'. These approaches highlight the multiplicity and hybrid quality of group identity and ethnicity.²³ Such standpoints clearly discard the pure national narratives and the various exclusive national discourses that believe collective identities were fully homogenized and patently national even well before the modern age. The new national or 'official' histories that blossomed on the ruins of the former Soviet Union have great difficulty in grasping and analysing supra-national identities and the concept of imperial citizenship that evolved in the course of common life in a multiethnic Empire.

It is now important to progress to the second theme, namely how Russian intellectuals at the time approached the question of the relation between nation and empire or, in other words, the discussions on the national question and how best to cope with this potentially explosive phenomenon within the Russian imperial context. As above, the period from the end of the Crimean War until 1905 will be examined.

Why put the emphasis on intellectual discourse? The obvious reason is that Russian intellectuals, individually or collectively, were very articulate and visible in their attempts to understand and envisage the real world and address the complicated question of ethnic and cultural diversity in their country. The intellectuals, through word and deed, had the ability to shape the cognitive, ethical and even the political 'maps' of their contemporaries. Their journals – notably the 'thick' variety – were one of the main avenues of dialogue and debate about the pressing political problems of the Empire and their authors and editors produced potent networks geared to communicating and promoting their views. They operated from the premise that it was not up to the state and its apparatus to decide public matters. The people of the empire, but most of all themselves, were entitled to influence political decision-making for the common good and for Russia.²⁴

Spearheaded by intellectuals or former state functionaries, by the nineteenth century in particular public debate had become increasingly common and important in the empire. The networks of intellectuals and other activists along with the journals formed what the *obshchestvennoe mnenie* (public opinion), which in the Russian context of the nineteenth century was regarded as the views, perceptions and beliefs fostered by activists and reformers; men who above all were – and were seen to be – independent in their judgement and moral stance. Not surprisingly, the comportment of state and its whole approach mostly dismayed these active individuals. As a result, they tended to be critical or disdainful of the imperial state and of its workings. Yet this was not always the case and there were times when revered thinkers took a more conciliatory line, even identifying with the state on a particular issue, though this was the exception in the turbulent Russia of the second part of the nineteenth century.

In the second part of nineteenth century, the national discourse certainly was not the only discussion engaged in by intellectuals; nor was it necessarily mainstream. It was in competition with other distinct discourses, namely the class approach and the dynastic approach, for the heart and minds of people and state.

For those active in the national debate, be they conservative, liberal or radical, the common thread was the acceptance and belief in the existence of nations as the main collectivities across the globe, if not in the past then at least in the present and certainly in the future. For them the nation was a basic analytical category. Furthermore, most of the intellectuals who accepted this image of the world regarded national self-determination as the inalienable right of all nations, particularly if these nations existed in other empires and other multi-ethnic societies. However, national self-determination or the principle of nationality, as it was known in the nineteenth century, did not necessarily imply secession but could include forms of self-assertion and national participation and expression via other means, such as through various forms of autonomy or within a federal framework.²⁵ There was considerable discussion on the notion of patriotism, in the sense that one could be a Russian patriot devoted to the state without being in fact ethnically

Russian. The nationalist discourse in Russia had many facets, ranging from ultra-conservatism to liberal or radical views. In order to illustrate, however impressionistically, what was going on at the time among intellectual circles, the characteristic views of three influential figures, Ivan A. Aksakov, Aleksandr A. Kireev and Vladimir S. Solov'ev, will be referred to here.

In right-wing nationalist discourse, the Russian state was "one and indivisible" but this was not enough: it was imperative that the country transform itself into a fully-fledged national state of ethnic Russians. In his writings, Aksakov, the distinguished Slavophile and right-wing conservative, expressed his opposition to the dynasty and promoted his own rendition of patriotism by identifying it with nationalism. He regarded the relationship between the Russian state and the Russian nation as sacred and went so far as not to distinguish between *rossiskij* (pertaining to the Russian state) and *rususkij* (being ethnically Russian). He was particularly harsh with the highest state elites for distinguishing between nationalism and patriotism (he also despised them on account of their varied ethnic origins), arguing that it was inconceivable to fight and sacrifice oneself for one's state, its territorial integrity or prestige. In his opinion, only suffering and fighting for the nation was conceivable. The concept of patriotism as advocated by the state elite and by a portion of the intelligentsia was void and lopsided and could not tap the genuine Russian spirit, he felt, so vibrant in the Russian countryside.²⁶

Not all conservatives or Slavophile thinkers, however, agreed with this viewpoint. A case in point was General Kireev, adjutant of the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, a well-known Russian Slavophile. His views combined nationalism with imperial rule. He was much closer to the original triadic dictum of "autocracy, Orthodoxy, nationality", famously set forth by Count Sergey S. Uvarov in 1834. A deeply religious person who sought salvation in Orthodoxy, Kireev was of the view that Orthodoxy was the vital element of Russian state identity. Absolutism had to bow to Orthodoxy and temper its power by introducing the institution of the *zemsto* conferences, a system of local administration. This, Kireev believed, was the convincing answer to what he regarded as the chaotic situation reigning in Western parliamentary systems. For him, the Russian nation was sacred; it was the state of Holy Russia; the Russians were the only true Orthodox nation. Hence, there could be no question on who was to hold sway in the Russian state. However, there was room for non-Orthodox ("infidel") Russian citizens to participate in this wider Russian *otechestvo* (fatherland) not out of fear but on the basis of a sense of common duty to this fatherland, as was the case for non-Catholic citizens in France or Catholics in Prussia. The general was a fervent champion of the rights of all Slavic peoples. Of course, this line placed him in a difficult position vis-à-vis the Polish question. His way out was to condemn the persecution of "aliens",²⁷ including Catholics, and to accept the right of the Poles to self-determination only on the proviso that they would accept Slavophile theories. However, for safe measure he was quick to remark that the true desire of the Poles was not independence as such, but no less than to dominate the Russians, on the basis of historical rights, something that was of course totally unacceptable.²⁸

As for the liberal strand, its hallmark in relation to the state tended to be the road of conciliation and negotiation. Its goal was not the Great Russian chauvinism of the conservatives nor the violent, revolutionary overthrow of the existing *ancien régime* as demanded by the radicals, but rather the path of peaceful evolutionary transformation into a thoroughly modern and democratic state. As regards nationalism and ethnicity, the public presence and political stance of many

liberals was a moral calling for tolerance towards ethnic diversity. It is worth stressing that the concept of tolerance is a constant feature of Russian discourse regarding the characteristics of Russian identity. In the wording of the liberals and some conservative Slavophiles, tolerance was seen as a Russian virtue, the stuff that could establish a *modus vivendi* between the Russians and the other peoples within the Empire. They tried to combine tolerance with the principle of nationality in its benign manifestations. Tolerance was inexorably associated with the notion of civilisation. Hence, the notion of civilisation and progress, as utilised by Imperial Russia and other colonial powers, was fake, a mere cloak for their expansionism and conquests.²⁹

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, criticism towards the phenomenon of nationalism gained momentum, particularly in the liberal and radical milieu. Reference was made to the degeneration of nationalism, which had come to be associated with a lack of tolerance and freedom, domination, brutality and imperialism. The intellectuals of these two traditions, motivated by the high ideal of human solidarity, increasingly came to regard the nation-state as *passé* and as an obstacle to human progress. Intolerance, the hallmark of nationalism, was regarded the antithesis of humane and civilised behaviour. This degradation from the role of a locomotive of to an impediment to historical progress was explained by the fact that nations – or a particular nation – came to be associated with states or a particular state.³⁰

A case in point among the liberal thinkers of this period was the distinguished philosopher and publicist, Vladimir S. Solov'ev, who was very influential and active in the two last decades of the nineteenth century.³¹ Solov'ev examined the current problems of Russian society from the prism of Eurocentric liberalism and the ethics emanating from Christian humanism, a subject on which he himself has made an outstanding contribution from the perspective of Orthodox theology and ethics. Solov'ev's main contribution as a publicist was to articulate the moral-ethical dimension of liberalism in the name of the 'common good', to put to task the rising conservatism of Alexander III and to counter the policies of Russification. His penetrating and often harsh critique of nationalist excesses, particularly carried out by and in the name of Russians, but also on the part of 'subject nations' who found themselves in a privileged position towards other weaker nations, gained him a wide audience as well as many staunch enemies.³²

Solov'ev distinguishes between "*narodnost*" (nation or nationality) and the notion of nationalism. He believed that the formation of nations was a vital course in the evolution of humanity, as it involved smaller units fusing into larger ones, a process he envisaged would continue until the goal of world historical evolution was achieved, which he understood would represent the "the return to unity for all". Accordingly, nations were vehicles of historical progress, but crucially not goals or ideal states in themselves. Nations were simply the different organs in the body of humanity and although progressive at a certain stage in world evolution, they were not innately progressive. Nations became progressive or retrogressive depending on their stance vis-à-vis humanity. In Solov'ev's estimation, it was crucial to examine whether a nation considered itself as distinct from the wider whole and dissociated itself from the rest of the world. If so, the nation in question had lapsed into regression.³³

Solov'ev recognised and defended the idea of national self-determination as the right of every nation. He was of the firm belief that every nation had the right to live independently from other nations and develop its national talents freely. For Solov'ev, the national idea was a call for political

participation and equality, for which the weaker nations struggled and sought freedom. At the same time, however, no state had a *carte blanche* in its emancipating role. The nation – any nation – could lapse into “nationalism or national egoism” to the extent that it sought to establish itself at the expense of another people. Such comportment was an affront to the national idea; it was dangerous to the world as a whole and to the nation in question and could lead its people to oblivion.³⁴

In Solov'ev's estimation, the concept of nationalism was not positive nor even neutral from an evaluative viewpoint. Nationalism, according to him, was by definition against human progress and could have no moral standing under any circumstances. It was a form of chauvinism and an expression of the worst in the nation concerned, not least in a culturally pluralist setting. As such, nationalism needed to be distinguished from patriotism, which is the genuine love for one's country (*otechestvo*). Patriotism for him was a form of self-negation of nationalism, though not of the nation or the people, for humanity was divided, for better or for worse, into separate nations and there was no immediate reason to overcome this division. Solov'ev was of the belief that all nations could produce positive feelings towards other nations. It was within this framework that Solov'ev placed the Russian nation and the Russian national question. The Russians after all were not under foreign rule. In their case, it was not a question of survival and liberation but one of decent coexistence with other nations. For the Russians (and Russia) it was essential to expunge every facet of nationalism and national egoism in midst. For Solov'ev, state and nation were distinct entities. The state and state politics needed to be above the nation; its main goal was guaranteeing security for all its citizens and welfare, in this way rendering its subjects true citizens, imbued with the idea of *grazhdanstvennost'* (citizenship).³⁵

In the late nineteenth century, liberalism and radicalism tried to combine national tolerance with the maintenance and territorial integrity of the Russian state by distinguishing between nation and state, as seen in Solov'ev's case. Liberal and radical thinkers approached national self-determination from the angle of statehood, which in the Russian case was associated with considerable prestige and the influence of being one of the Great Powers. According to this line of reasoning, a nation could be free, content and a master of its own destiny without necessarily gaining the trappings of statehood as a nation-state. With the removal of the state and territorial elements from the concept of nation, the emphasis was put on the cultural sphere, which alone could provide collective identity and sense of worth within a wider state. Increasingly the idea came to prevail that large multicultural countries should not disintegrate along national grounds. Indeed any such disintegration leading to the creation of smaller, (nation) states was bound to create more problems than solutions. In order for Russia to survive, it had to become the homeland (*patrie*) of all of its constituent ethnicities.

The liberals saw the national question as one important aspect of the wider social question in the Empire and in this context they sought the granting and reinforcement of civil liberties and the equality in law and practice of all the members of ethnic groups and minorities. Two threads run through liberal thinking in Russia at the time in its internal debates as well as vis-à-vis the Empire: the meaning and content of patriotism and the meaning and content of citizenship (*grazhdanstvennost'*). It is these two concepts that could invigorate the nationalities in Russia without at the same time giving rise to centrifugal tendencies, as has been the case until now with the policies of Russification and the nationalist reaction to them.³⁶

This paper has tried to approach the setting of state policies on ethnicity and the views of intellectuals in the latter nineteenth century not from the point of the ultimate and inescapable conflict between Empire and Nation – with the nation-state as the obvious winner – but rather from the point of possible reconciliation, as advocated by the liberals in particular. According to this alternative viewpoint, the impending twentieth century could become the century that would abolish national confrontation; the century that would dissolve the boundaries of nations and render state boundaries irrelevant.³⁷ Of course we know, with bitter hindsight, that the twentieth century did not meet the expectations of Russian liberals. Nevertheless, as we enter the new world of the twenty-first century, their thoughts are of considerable value.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Uffe Ostergaard, "Nation States and Empires in the Current Process of European Change", in Ola Tu-nander et. al. (eds.), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity*, London: Sage 1997, pp. 94–119.
- 2 See for example the dialogue between L. Zuhovitskij and A. Tsipko in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* 17 & 23 (2003). For some post-empire nostalgia see V. L. Terekhov, "Russia – the Inevitability of Empire", *Russian Studies in History* 37:2 (1998), pp. 88–96. Another aspect of the recent discussion on empire is associated with the themes associated with international relations, politics and economics at the global level set forth by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Harvard: Harvard UP, 2000. On the question on where to place present-day Russia in this context, see S. I. Kaspe, "Imperia pod udarom: konets debatov o politike i kul'ture", unpublished conference paper available at <http://www.empires.ru> (last accessed 2 Sept. 2004).
- 3 This development has been given extensive scholarly attention owing to the emergence of political parties on the one hand, and because various ethnic groups such as Muslims, Poles, Armenians, Jews, Baltic Germans, Lithuanians, Georgians and others, made themselves very visible in the Duma on the other. As all or most had a communal agenda to grind, it was inevitable that the issue of nationality was bound to be hotly discussed in the Russian-language press. See Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914*, DeKalb: Northern Illinois UP, 1996, and "Political and National Survival in the Late Russian Empire: The Case of the Korwin-Milewski Brothers", *East European Quarterly* 33:3 (1999), pp. 347–369; and "National Minorities in the Russian Empire, 1897–1917", in Anna Geifman (ed.), *Russia under the Last Tsar. Opposition and Subversion, 1894–1917*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 111–134.
- 4 *Obshchestvennost'* can translate as public sphere or public service. See Joseph Bradley, "Voluntary Associations, Civic Culture, and Obshchestvennost' in Moscow", in Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow and James L. West (eds.), *Between Tsar and People. Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in*

Late Imperial Russia, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991, pp. 131–148; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, *Structures and Society. Imperial Russia's 'People of Various Ranks'*, DeKalb: Northern Illinois UP, 1994.

- 5 David Wartenweiler, *Civil Society and Academic Debate in Russia 1905–1914*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, pp. 1–10; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "In Search of the People, In Search of Russia", *Russian Review* 60:4 (2001), pp. 497–504.
- 6 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Nationalities in the Russian Empire", *Russian Review* 59:4 (2000), pp. 487–492. Entitled "Ethnicity and Nationality Question in Imperial Russia", this was a special issue of the journal, which contains some other relevant articles. Since its launch in 2000, the scholarly periodical *Ab Imperio* examines Russian history from the perspective of empire.
- 7 See for example Roger Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996, p. 27; Mark von Hagen, "The Russian Empire", in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 58–72; Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, London: Pearson, 2001; Geoffrey A. Hosking, *Russia. People and Empire, 1552–1917*, Cambridge, HarperCollins, 1997.
- 8 Sanders Thomas (ed.), *Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
- 9 Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, p. 239.
- 10 As pointed out by A. Kappeler, this viewpoint is due to a large extent to the historical writings of Polish immigrants writing from the perspective of national history. See Andreas Kappeler, "The Ambiguities of Russification", *Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5:2 (2004), p. 296.
- 11 Edward Thaden, "Russification", in James Cracraft (ed.), *Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia*, Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1994, pp. 403–409; Robert P. Geraci, *Windows on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 2001; Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State*; Alexei Miller, "Russifikatsii: Klassifitsirovat' I poniat'" [Russifications: Classified and Explained], *Ab Imperio* 2 (2002), pp. 133–148; Mikhail Dolbilov, "Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire's Northwestern Region in the 1860s", *Kritika Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5:2 (2004), pp. 245–271; Darius Staliunas, "Did the Government Seek to Russify Lithuanians and Poles in the Northwest Regions after the Uprising of 1863–64?", *Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5:2 (2004), pp. 273–289; Wayne Dowler, *Classroom and Empire. The Politics of Schooling Russia's Eastern Nationalities, 1860–1917*, Montréal: McGill–Queen's UP, 2001.
- 12 Robert P. Geraci, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–14.
- 13 *Ibid.*; Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question. The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Budapest: Central European UP, 2003.
- 14 Miller examines the question from the angle of interaction between agents and objects of Russification and the changes of perceptions over time of the former. See Miller, "Russifikatsii: Klassifitsirovat' I poniat'", *op. cit.*, pp. 133–148.

- 15 In several instances the introduction of Russian was intended as a lingua franca rather than a form of ethnic assimilation.
- 16 See Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998 & 2000, vol. 2, pt. 2, *passim*.
- 17 Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State*; Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Russian Image of Russia: An applied Study in Geopolitical Methodology", in Charles Fisher (ed.), *Essays in Political Geography*, London: Methuen, 1968, pp. 345–387; Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The State Idea, the National Idea and the Image of the Fatherland", *Orbis* 11:1 (1967), pp. 238–255.
- 18 L. N. Vdovina, "What are 'We'? Russian National Consciousness in its Historical Context from the Middle Ages to Modern Times", *Russian Studies in History* 37:2 (1998), pp. 25–35; Mark von Hagen, "The Russian Empire", in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 58–72; N. I. Tsimbaev, "Russia and the Russians (The Nationality Question in the Russian Empire)", *Russian Studies in History* 37:2 (1998), pp. 53–68.
- 19 Dov Yaroshevski, "Empire and Citizenship", in Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (eds.), *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1750–1917*, Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997, pp. 58–79, esp. pp. 74–75; Austin Lee Jersild, "From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire", in *ibid.*, pp. 101–114.
- 20 A culture which was not only highly advanced but was also open to diversity and external influences. In addition the non-ethnic Russian elites were often genuinely cosmopolitan in their approach, as were many ethnic Russians. Many members of the educated classes of the Byelorussians, the Ukrainians, the Germans and others opted for Russian culture without jettisoning their own cultural affinity. This also applied to many Muslims and Jews, one of their aims being to modernize their societies. See Dominic Lieven, *The Russian Empire and its Rivals*, Yale: Yale UP, 2000, p. 276.
- 21 Jane Burbank, "Revisioning Imperial Russia", *Slavic Review* 52:3 (1993), pp. 557–558.
- 22 Patrice M. Dabrowski, "Russian-Polish Relations Revisited, or the ABC's of 'Treason' under Tsarist Rule", *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4:1 (2003), pp. 177–199; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "In Search of the People, In Search of Russia", *Russian Review* 60:4 (2001), pp. 497–504.
- 23 In particular, see "Introduction" and "Epilogue" in Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (eds.), *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998; Jane Burbank, *op. cit.*, pp. 555–567. A relevant theme is the extended debate over Russian orientalism, the basic elements of which can be found in *Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1:4 (2000), in the articles of Adeeb Khalid, "Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism", pp. 691–700; Nathaniel Knight, "On Russian Orientalism: A Response to Adeeb Khalid", pp. 701–716; Maria Todorova, "Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul? A Contribution to the Debate between Nathaniel Knight and Adeeb Khalid", pp. 717–728. See also: Laura Engelstein, "New Thinking about the Old Empire: Post Soviet Reflections", *Russian Review* 60:4 (2001), pp. 487–496; Richard S. Wortman, *op. cit.*
- 24 Deborah A. Martinsen (ed.), *Literary Journals in Imperial Russia*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.

- 25 On this issue see Ada Dialla, *Panslavism and the Eastern Question in the Second Half of the 19th Century: The Russian Dialogue*, Athens: Papazissis, (forthcoming) 2005.
- 26 Ivan Aksakov, *Slavjaskij Vopros. 1860–1886. [The Slavic Question 1860–1886]*, Moscow: M. G. Volchaninov, 1886, p. 733.
- 27 On this term see John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia”, *Russian Review* 57:2 (1998), pp. 173–190.
- 28 A. Kireev, *Kratkoe izlozhenie slavjanofil’skogo uchenija [Short Presentation on Slavophile Teaching]*, St Petersburg, 1896, pp. 75–76, 89.
- 29 M. P., “Ideja natsional’nogo gosudarstva [The Idea of the Nation State]”, *Russkoe Bogatstvo* 8 (1903), pp. 80–87.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 On Solov’ev see: Andrej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy. History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975; Greg Gaut, “Can a Christian Be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov’ev’s Critique of Nationalism”, *Slavic Review* 57:1 (1998), pp. 77–94. See also S. M. Solov’ev and Th. L. Radlov (eds.), *Sobranie sochinenij Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov’eva [Selected Works of V. S. Solov’ev]*, 5 vols, St Petersburg: Prosveshchenie, 1883–1892. Henceforth *Sobranie sochinenij*.
- 32 *Sobranie sochinenij*, pp. 416–425.
- 33 Ibid., p. 187.
- 34 Ibid., pp. 159–160, 204.
- 35 Ibid., p. 75–81.
- 36 M. A. Slavinskij, “Russkaja intelligentsija i natsional’nij vopros”, available at <http://www.yabloko.ru/Themes/History/slavinsk.html> (last accessed on 21 Sept. 2004).
- 37 M. P. “Ideja natsional’ogo gosudarstva [The Idea of the Nation State]”, *Russkoe Bogatstvo* 8 (1903), p. 87.